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1. Entropy as the measure of our 
uncertainty in knowing the World 
According to original Shannon’s concept entropy is 
the measure assigned to the spectrum of possible states of 
a given system. The formula 
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where pi is the probability of state i reaches the 
null value for the case when the cognitive subject knows 
exactly in which state the system is. The practical use of 
this formula strongly depends upon the actual ability to 
determine ALL possible states of the system and ability to 
estimate ACTUAL PROBABILITIES of those states, which 
is possible only for highly idealized and reduced systems. 
Thus direct application of such measure to our general 
knowledge of the world seems rather impossible unless we 
suggest some general procedures to reduce the number of 
‘possible worlds’. The way philosophy maintains such a 
task is metaphysics of the world.  
A cognitive subject can reduce his/her uncertainty 
through gaining some information. Incoming information 
can change the subject’s knowledge in two ways: it may 
either eliminate some possible states or it can change the 
way the subject ‘partitions’ the world. The former situation 
corresponds to gaining some knowledge in the way of 
empirical examining the world – the result of an experiment 
reduces our uncertainty of the world by selecting of the 
whole spectrum of expectable answers to the 
“experimental question” those which may be the most 
probable. We claim that the expectable answers are not 
declarations stated by “the World” but result from our 
ability predict “the World’s” behavior. Such predictions are 
based upon a certain metaphysical model of “the World” as 
well as upon the theoretical background. 
The latter would rather resemble the change in 
‘paradigm’ suggested by T.Kuhn and thus is characteristic 
to the discovery processes. It is evident that the both are 
not independent.  
 
2. Relative entropy concept 
The way a cognitive subject computes the entropy 
depends on the way he/she “partitions” the world i.e. what 
number and kinds of possible states of the world are 
possible according to the metaphysical representation of 
the world.  
Provided one and only one metaphysical 
representation of the world is possible and this one is 
‘uniquely filled out’ with the ‘scientific theories’ one can try 
to evaluate the entropy. In the more probable case, where 
there are competitive theories or, which is even worse, 
competitive metaphysical representations, the problem can 
be handled with the use of the concept of relative entropy 
between two probability distributions P(x) and Q(x) 
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In general the relative entropy is not symmetric 
under interchange of the distributions P(x) and Q(x) 
)()( PQDQPD ≠ , 
Both distributions P(x) and Q(x) are defined over 
the same alphabet AX 
The measure of information resulting from the 
relative entropy formula is lower than the one resulting 
from original Shannon’s formula. As the formula can be 
reversed one can get the measure of world partitioning and 
consequently a measure of information content embedded 
in a certain metaphysical hypothesis. This, however 
requires the existence of clean, separate metaphysical 
pictures of the world, which does not seem to be the case 
in any period of history of philosophy. What is more, one 
can hardly expect such situation in the future. 
Therefore one should note that the relative entropy 
formula does not, and cannot, contain the complete 
probability. In order to use the latter we would have to be 
in possession of the complete knowledge of the world. The 
ability to possess such a knowledge is a myth present in 
philosophy since Aristotle. Mythical character of this 
assumption results from at least two premises:  
the world seems open  
our knowledge does not partition the world 
uniquely 
Here we would like to stress that standard concept 
of cognition based upon the assumption that a cognitive 
subject is spiritual and “isolated” from the world and 
information can be considered as spiritual substance only. 
As long as such assumption remains the base of 
epistemology no progress is possible. 
 
3. Information and its usefulness  
The relative entropy concept does not cover all 
aspects of information usefulness. Pragmatic approach to 
information requires also including the actual use of the 
information. As this is often considered subjective we 
would like to concentrate on some objective characteristics 
of information use. When we think of information as a 
means of subject’s fitness to the real world. The thesis, 
that cognitive subjects are subject to natural selection 
bridges the gap between abstractive cognition and 
“physical” reality. The cognitive subject no longer is a 
“purely spiritual” entity but is treated as a specific 
subsystem of the world. A specific system because of 
his/her homeostatic functions, but a subsystem since 
he/she is connected to the world with multiple feedback 
relations.  
Understanding information should be based upon 
its realistic function as evolutional fitness. As evolution 
theory suggests, we must thus introduce a certain “fitness 
factor”.  
The problem seems to be of nonlinear character 
where methods of complexity analysis would be more 
appropriate. Nevertheless, continuing the examples 
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coming from other sciences we suggest some 
linearization:  
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The factor )(ξF  should show the following 
features:  
tend to zero when fitness of information tends to 
zero 
tend to Shannon formula when fitness of 
information tends to infinity 
be negative when fitness becomes negative 
The above requirements can be fulfilled for 
instance by a formula: 
)1()( ξξ −−= eF  
The suggested formula has some advantages: 
it reveals the real value of information not 
subjective one 
it covers all interactions of the cognitive subject 
with his/her environment; no matter what partitioning are 
it lets for accounting of negative fitness 
it shows that control processes can be treated as 
the information edge. 
it gives qualitative factor ready for simulation of 
cognitive processes 
Apparently the ability to include both  concepts: 
relative entropy and evolutional “fitness factor” should give 
a means to estimate “objective” assessment of 
metaphysics. It would also allow to treat such assessment 
dynamically. This would be especially beneficial for 
describing the culture flow.  
 
4. Conclusion – why “objective”? 
For centuries philosophy have taught us how to 
search the most objective and the most certain knowledge. 
On the other side information theory gives us a means to 
measure not what we know about the world but what we 
can expect i.e. what we do not know in such strong 
meaning of this word as we are used to assign to logic.  
Our considerations in this topic lead to the 
following conclusions: 
it is impossible to construct a homomorphism 
between the knowledge and the world: first - information 
comes to a subject dynamically, second – the environment 
(the world) changes, last but not least – any attempt to 
estimate the complete probability must fail because the 
classes established by different metaphysics are not 
separate – thus correspondence concept of truth must be 
abandoned 
the latter does not mean that any subject can 
construct the world’s image freely (which is often called 
relativization of knowledge) 
our knowledge – or as we would rather say: 
information about the real world – is not certain but rather 
probable but still useful because of its influence on our 
fitness to the world 
the objective does not necessarily mean anti-
relative – as a subsystem of the Universe trying to learn Its 
structure we are both cognitive subjects and objects within 
this Universe – this has several consequences: a need for 
“new language of science”, which would reflect the 
complexity of systems examined, based on Principia 
Cybernetica rather than Principia Mathematica, a need for 
revision of classical philosophical divisions such as the 
spiritual and the material, the mental and the mechanical,  
there is a need for changing the objectives of 
science: the aim of science is not finding the truth about 
the universe but rather deciding which of the theoretical 
pictures of the world is better fitted to reality. 
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